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The (Land) Administration ... may
exercise such rights and powers as may be
necessary or proper for the carrying out
of the purposes hereof, including, but not
limited to, the following:
(q) To acquire, in the manner provided
in this act, private property and keep it in
reserve, for the benefit of the people of
Puerto Rico, for the use of the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico or its agencies.'
Act 13 of May 16, 1962
Act 13 of 16th of May, 1962, is constitu-
tional in all its aspects, means and man-
ners. It constitutes a legitimate use of pub-
lic power in protection of that which a
community of 2,712,808 human beings
existing in a little territory of 3,435 square
miles sees as a most precious value for
survival: vital space. 2
Associate Justice Carlos Santana
Becerra for the Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico in Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico v. Rosso
*A.B. 1965, DePauw University; J.D. 1968, University of Michigan. The author is
presently a Michigan-Ford Scholar at the University of Nottingham, England.
Mr. Callies would like to acknowledge the services of Mr. Eduardo Mendez, of
Chicago, Illinois, who reviewed the exact translation of the quotations and hold-
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note published by the author in the American Society of Planning Officials Land
Use Controls, September 1968.
1 ACT No. 13 of May 16, 1962 (2d Sess. of 4th Legislative Assembly).
2 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Russo, No. 67-172 (Supreme Court of Puerto




As the supply of vacant land on which to expand dwindles, the eco-
nomic, social and cultural blight attendant upon the rapid but relatively
unplanned growth of metropolitan areas increasingly becomes a subject of
grave concern throughout the world. The two most common traditional
approaches to land use problems are now proving inadequate, given the
nature of urban sprawl. The first is zoning, basically an exercise of the
police power whereby a governmental body restricts the use of land by
appropriate regulation without compensating the owner. The restriction
must be for the purpose of promoting the health, morals, safety or welfare
of some segment of the whole community. Even if this condition is satis-
fied, many decisions have invalidated zoning regulations as being so restric-
tive that they constitute an actual taking for which compensation must be
paid.3 The restrictiveness of a regulation is evaluated by taking into con-
sideration such factors as surrounding area uses and reasonable return on
property values. Yet these factors clearly tend to be linked with present
usages and values, making it nearly impossible for the government to use
zoning as an effective instrument to allow for projected future indetermi-
nate usages. Comprehensive planning for urban areas has demonstrated
that successful control of developments requires that the planning instru-
ment allow maneuverability. The traditional power of zoning simply does
not allow this indeterminate flexibility. Moreover, zoning is essentially
negative. It can preclude undesirable uses of land, but it cannot compel
and may not even encourage desirable land uses.
A second approach has been through exercise of the power of eminent
domain. If a governmental agency can establish a valid public use or pur-
pose, it may compulsorily purchase land from a private landowner in
return for compensation approximating its fair market value. At first
glance, eminent domain seems to provide a way around such restrictive
factors as present area uses which limit the effectiveness of the zoning
power. The government could buy necessary lands at their fair market
value and provide for their disposition in a manner best designed to control
urban sprawl. The power of eminent domain is clearly an affirmative
power, but it has other limitations than that of fair compensation. The
power must be exercised for some definite public purpose, and the courts
have in the past refused to uphold condemnations without such purpose. 4
The more effective way to combat urban sprawl is to compel the non-
use of land for an indefinite period of time by an exercise of public power.
This would give the government an opportunity to develop the land by
selling or otherwise disposing of it with appropriate use restrictions in
accord with a master plan for the region. This is the essence of land bank-
ing, a scheme embodying the belief that:
3 See cases collected at 101 CTS. Zoning §29 (1958), n. 80 to 82.
4 See cases collected at 26 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain §27 (1966), n. 17.
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. . . land at the urban fringe which is to
be developed for urban uses should be ac-
quired by a public agency. Acquisition, in
fact, should run well ahead of anticipated
need and include the purchase or condem-
nation of idle or agricultural land well be-
yond the present urban limits. The public
agency, therefore, should be given terri-
torial jurisdiction which includes not only
the present central city and surrounding
suburbs but a wide belt of undeveloped
land.5
In effect, land banking is an extension of the power of eminent domain.
Although the taking is compulsory and fully compensated, it is accom-
lished without establishing a specific, contemporary public purpose for
the land's use. 6 The land so acquired and retained for a later unspecified
use generally consists of vacant, undeveloped parcels along the fringe
of metropolitan areas. 7 Though the practical difficulties of using this
particular method for curbing urban sprawl are not insubstantial, 8 any
5 Reps, The Future of American Planning: Requiem or Renascence? 1967 PLANNING
47, at 49. Cf. note 26 infra for other advocates.
6 ld.
7 American Society of Planning Officials. NEw DIRECTIONS IN CONNECTICUT PLAN-
NING LEGISLATION 65-66 (1967).
S Reps, supra note 5, at 53-55. Two difficulties which Reps stresses stem from the
desirable scope of the policy and the methods of land disposal to be employed.
As to the first, he points out that:
Realism would seem to dictate that whatever the
eventual scope, initial efforts would be rather
modest. Time will be required to get under way.
Near-in vacant land already includes in its price
the anticipated speculative value which our cur-
rent policies produce. Not all of this land can
be acquired because of the financial burden that
would be imposed. It may be that we must con-
trol development in these areas for the next
several years as best we can using mainly tra-
ditional methods of regulation. Meanwhile the
metropolitan land corporation could be engaged
in acquiring land further from the fringe at
more reasonable prices while making occasional
purchases of more central sites where possible.
With regard to the second, he discusses the relative merits of sale and lease as
methods of making land available for development. Although conceding that,
"From the standpoint only of effective control over the physical environment
either method of disposal can work," he favors a system of leases. This would
allow the whole community, rather than a single private owner, to recoup
increases in urban land values that result from publicly financed improvements,
growth of population, and the process of urbanization.
December 1968]
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attempt to apply the method is often frustrated by the legal problem of
justifying the compulsory acquisition of this fringe-area land in terms
of public use. The regulation of use that results from land banking is
so broad and indefinite that it is doubtful that it could be sustained under
a traditional interpretation of the eminent domain power. It is basic to
the exercise of the power of eminent domain that the condemned land be
used for a public purpose. 9 The problem is that the courts have often con-
strued this to mean a specific public purpose, rather than an undetermined,
unspecified one. This has been true even in those jurisdictions which do not
require that the land be used immediately for the benefit of the public.0
It. The Case
Against this backdrop of traditional judicial antipathy toward the ex-
ercise of eminent domain for the purpose of creating reserves of land
for unspecified future development, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
resoundingly upheld legislation expressly providing for such land bank-
ing as a means to cure urban sprawl. The subject of the case is the con-
stitutionality of a taking of private property under the authority of Act
13, passed by the legislative assembly of Puerto Rico on May 16, 1962.
The legislative intent in passing Act 13 is quite ambitious: to eliminate
those economic and social ills which accompany the shortage of space
caused by unplanned urban expansion. In a lengthy purpose clause, the
legislative assembly enumerates the ills that have beset the tiny island
with the explosive increase in the use of and demand for land:
(a) That the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico is one of the most densely populated
areas in the world; that urban lands, or
lands adapted to urban development, are
monopolized and kept unused by their
owners, which creates an artificial shortage
of land and raises its price at a rate higher
than the raise in price of other properties
and staple commodities; that the speedy
raise in the price of land makes it impos-
sible for persons of moderate or low re-
sources to purchase land in appropriate
areas, and forces such persons to build
their homes outside of close-to-town areas
and far from their places of work and
other activities; that the raise in the price
of land makes for undesirable urban ex-




pansions, which, in turn, creates serious
financial problems to the Commonwealth
and municipal governments, as the costs
of providing public services such as roads,
water, sewers, public parks, public health,
fire prevention and fire fighting, police
vigilance, and others such as are neces-
sary for the protection of life and prop-
erty, so essential for the development of
a community, increase several times; that
the raise in the price of land increases the
overhead cost of industrial and commer-
cial enterprises and, therefore, sets their
products at a disadvantage in competition
locally as well as abroad; that the rela-
tively speedy raise in the price of land in-
creases differences in income, inasmuch as
unused land in Puerto Rico, both urban
and rural, is controlled, to a large extent,
by a small number of persons;
(c) that the raise in the price of land
also affects or prevents the implementing
of the master plans and is a cause of
worry for the public conglomerate and
constitutes a serious problem, to control
which available public funds may be put
to maximum use, by authorizing the ac-
quisition of private property whenever
necessary;
(d) that it is in the public interest to
avoid, as soon as possible, the excessive
and disproportionate increase in the mar-
ket price of land.l
The purpose clause frankly admits that traditional remedies have so far
failed:
(b) that this ever-increasing price of
land cannot be controlled, nor the prob-
lems thereby created can be solved, by
any of the tools available to the Common-
wealth and municipal governments; that
the levy of taxes and the regulations of
11 ACT No. 13 supra note 1, Statement of Motives.
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physical planning are insufficient; that the
regulation on subdivision and zoning op-
erates prospectively for undeveloped and
underdeveloped areas and cannot prevent
the undesirable, but legal, use of the land;
and that the regulation on land sub-divi-
sion is insufficient to control either the
expansion of city limits or the discon-
nected and inadequate expansion of the
cities ... 12
With its aims thus clearly stated, the legislative assembly proceeded to
grant broad and sweeping powers to the Land Administration, created by
the same statute: 1 3
(j) To acquire property in any lawful
manner . . . and to hold, maintain, use
and avail itself of, or utilize any real or
personal property ...
(k) To sell, grant options of sale, sell
by instalments, convey, exchange, lease or
otherwise dispose of its property in the
course of its normal operations, except by
gift, which may only be made for the
benefit of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico and its agencies ...
(q) To acquire, in the manner pro-
vided in this act, private property and
keep it in reserve, for the benefit of the
People of Puerto Rico, for the use of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or its
agencies . . .
(s) To acquire real property, urban or
rural, which may be kept in reserve to-
ward facilitating the continuation of the
development of public work and social
and economic welfare programs which
may be under way or which may be un-
dertaken by the Administration itself, by
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or its
12 Id.
13 Id. at §3(a).
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agencies, and by private persons for the
benefit of the above-mentioned public en-
tities or of the community, including, but
not limited to, housing and industrial de-
velopment programs, in order to prevent
the inflation brought about by speculative
practices in the purchase-sale of real es-
tate and to allow for population growth
in an organized and planned manner ...
(b-I) To sell, whenever it may deem
it necessary and desirable, lands or any
other interest therein, at such price as it
may consider reasonable in order to lower
the cost of the houses or to fulfill any of
the purposes of this act.14
Act 13 further provided that possession of the condemned property could
be taken before the amount of compensation had been finally determined
if an amount equal to a good faith estimate of the value of the property
was placed with the court.' 5
Clearly the legislature intended to grant the power to take private prop-
erty and hold it in a land bank for some unspecified future use. Yet land-
owners and speculators were not ready to give up their valuable properties
without a legal struggle, for these would naturally increase in value as the
metropolitan areas spread toward them. This situation led to the conflict
which became the case of Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Rosso.16
Acting under the authority conferred by Act 13 and within the confines
of a plan drawn up subsequent thereto,' 7 the Planning Commission began
proceedings to acquire land around the city of San Juan. Among the prop-
erties involved were two parcels of land -137.7 by 118.26 cuerdas
(chains) and 25.519 by 62.8528 cuerdas - owned by Jorge I. and Car-
men Descartes Rosso. Despite an administrative determination that their
land could be taken, the Rossos refused to leave. On December 5, 1963,
14 ld. at §7.
15 d. at §14(b).
16 See note 2 supra.
17 On August 29, 1962, the Land Administration submitted to the Puerto Rican
Planning Board a plan for the development of the metropolitan area of San
Juan, under which it intended to acquire private estates surrounding San
Juan for the purposes of implementing the legislative aims of ACT 13. On
January 23, 1963, the Board approved the plan, the main aim of which was to
reduce prices of land around the city. High prices were making it difficult for
industries and private individuals to acquire sites and homes. It was declared




the Commonwealth interposed a decree for forceful expropriation of the
Rosso lands for the use and benefit of the Land Administration. The Ros-
sos sued for an injunction to stay proceedings under Act 13 and for a
declaration that Act 13 was unconstitutional. On February 24, 1964, the
lower court suspended the forceful expropriation decree. On July 2, after
a trial on the merits, the court voided the expropriation resolution passed
pursuant to Act 13 on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional.
The lower court's opinion was traditionally stated: the concept of public
use did not permit the state to exercise the power of eminent domain to
condemn private property without some specific plan for the land. Al-
though it considered itself a liberal court and admitted that the term
"public use" was incapable of precise definition, the court nonetheless
stated that expropriation statutes, which so sharply impinge upon private
property rights, ought to be strictly interpreted. Firmly placing itself in the
eminent domain school that requires clear public necessity before condem-
nation is permitted, the court said:
The 'necessity' which justifies an expro-
priation is that which exists in the present
or in the immediate future and it is re-
quired for the expropriation itself and for
the public works contemplated. . . . A fu-
ture indefinite or speculative necessity is
not enough....
Private property, and moreover, the land
which is referred to in this plea cannot be
expropriated for a use which is not re-
vealed. [Emphasis added]18
The Commonwealth appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico which reversed the lower court and held Act 13 constitutional
in all respects. The overriding theme of the opinion of the Supreme Court
of Puerto Rico was that unplanned, unregulated use of land was the cause
of all the enumerated ills, and planning and development of land their cure.
The Court quoted extensively from the purpose clause of Act 13 and set
out numerous statistics calling attention to the explosive growth of the
Commonwealth in the last decade and its projected growth in the next. 19
18 Commonwealth v. Rosso, supra note 2, at 30-3 1.
19 Among the statistics cited by the court in a footnote to pages 5-10 of the Rosso
opinion were the following: (1) The rate of building construction went up
from approximately 2,000 units/year in the decade 1950-1960 to 7,600 units/
year in 1966. In the same 1950-1960 decade some 38,000 private dwellings
were constructed in the metropolitan area of San Juan. (2) In the past decade
the metropolitan area of San Juan absorbed the entire population increase sus-
tained by Puerto Rico. From a population of 509,000 in 1950 it increased to
648,000 in 1960, despite substantial emigration. It has been anticipated that the
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The Court stressed the fact that other cities, notably in Europe, had been
condemning private land for land banking purposes for some time.20 It
found further support in a 1965 Papal Encyclical issued by Pope John
XXIII.21
Satisfied that there were social, economic, and moral justifications for its
decision,22 the Court turned briefly to the legal issues involved. Indicating
that the trial court was perhaps doctrinally correct, the Court chastised it
for being old-fashioned:
The view of the sentencing court, which
did not see a public use or interest in all
population will be 863,000 in 1970 and 1,112,000 in 1980. (3) The number of
jobs in the metropolitan area has increased from 140,000 in 1950 to 180,000 in
1960, and it is anticipated that there will be 254,000 jobs in 1970 and 326,000
jobs in 1980. Of this increment it is expected that 65% will be in industrial
manufacturing and 33% in government. It appears that this will result in an
increase of 80,000 in the number of families able to earn $3,000/year in the
decade 1960-70. It is therefore anticipated that the demand for homes will
increase spectacularly. By 1980 it is anticipated that 206,000 families will be
able to earn $3,000/year, with most of these families young, the men being in
the 20-25 year age bracket. It is anticipated that from 20,800 of these families
in 1960 there will be 42,000 by 1970 and 47,000 by 1980. (4) Although the
present density has been six dwellings/cuerda it is expected under the new guide-
lines established by the planning commission that the density will increase to
eight living units/cuerda. The 170,000 living units which are expected to be
required by 1980 will require some 20,700 cuerdas. (5) To realize the objectives
of public housing for 1970 family residence, it will be necessary to construct
about 16,000 units of public housing and to develop some 12,000 plots of land.
It will be necessary to duplicate this number between 1970 and 1980. (6) In
total it is anticipated that there will be required around the metropolitan area
about 28,720 cuerdas by 1980; 25,720 of these cuerdas constitute vacant urban-
izable land in the metropolitan area included in the outline of the project
submitted by the Land Administration.
20 Commonwealth v. Rosso, supra note 2, at 35-36.
21 Id. at 38-46. The Encyclical appears to justify state control of land. The Pope
condoned the condemnation of private property on moral grounds if it appeared
that the rich were getting richer and the poor were getting poorer because land
holdings were so disproportionate that the poor did not even own plots on which
to erect homes. The Pope spoke out against speculation and speculators and
encouraged the state to exercise economic power to determine the use and
ownership of land.
22 In the course of its opinion, the court also cited the following authorities to
buttress its view that eminent domain would be exercised for a public purpose
if used according to a general plan to purchase land to be held for future
development: Report of the Conference of the United Nations for the Applica-
tion of Science and Technology for the Benefit of Underdeveloped Areas, Vol. 5,
People and Living, 1963 PUBLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 167; J.
GRAHAM, HOUSING IN SCANDINAVIA, 3-7 (1940); Grier, Grobias and Wagner,
The Problem of Cities and Towns, CONFERENCE AT HARVARD UPON THE PROB-
LEM OF URBANISM 87, 93, 110 and 113 (1962); C. HAAR, LAND PLANNING
IN A FREE SOCIETY 127 (1951); Miscellaneous writings of Don Jose Castan.
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this, is somewhat out of focus in these
present times. 23
The Court stated that strict limitations upon governmental authority and
the preservation of exclusive private property rights in the face of the com-
mon need and the common good were stale concepts.
Noting that the Puerto Rican constitution guaranteed the right to private
property, the Court called attention to a recent amendment to Article 282
of the 1902 Civil Code which broadened the permissible grounds for con-
demnation to include "social benefit" as well as public use:
No one can be deprived of his property
unless by competent authority, for just
cause of public use or for social benefit,
and through payment of just compensa-
tion, that will be fixed in a form provided
by law. [Emphasis added]24
The legislators who added this phrase generally were the same men who,
as constitutional convention delegates, had drafted the property guarantee
in the Puerto Rican Constitution. The Court, noting this fact, concluded
that public use and social benefit, as well as social interest and common
good, were meant to be synonymous. Thus, the exercise of eminent do-
main for any of these purposes would be legally sanctioned by the Consti-
tution and fundamental statutes of the Commonwealth. In Act 13, the
legislature had determined that the taking of property for an unspecified
use was consonant with the concept of public use and social benefit. The
Court was unwilling to interfere with this legislative judgment:
Once the legislative declaration ... is for
a public purpose, in the significant pres-
ent concept, it is not incumbent upon this
court to interfere with the ways and
means which the legislature or its dele-
gated organ chooses to exercise the power
of expropriation, nor with a selection
which they have made of the land to be
expropriated. 25
Thus the Court held: (1) that Act 13, the creation of the Land Adminis-
tration and its authorization to carry out the purposes of the Act were all
constitutional in every respect; and (2) that all the works, projects, pow-
23 Commonwealth v. Rosso, supra note 2, at 33.
24 Id. at 53.
25 Id. at 56.
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ers, facilities and prerogatives of the Land Administration under the Act
were vested, as the legislature intended, with a public interest and a social
benefit.
It is apparent that the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
reflected the urgency of the facts in the situation and not the state of
existing law. The Court cited fourteen American and Puerto Rican de-
cisions but did not analyze any of them individually. 26 Instead, the first
fifty-five pages of the opinion were devoted largely to statistics and non-
legal sources illustrating the magnitude of the problem. The rapid growth
and limited land in Puerto Rico not only generated hardships for the popu-
lation in terms of housing and living space but also encouraged speculation
in outlying regions which contributed to the non-development of needed
land and to increased land prices.
III. The Appeal
The importance of the decision for the concept of land banking as a
solution to the disorderly, sprawling growth of metropolitan areas is evi-
dent. Such a broad definition of public use has never been so specifically
upheld within the legal system of the United States.
But the decision is not without legal support, and certainly is merited
by the facts of the particular situation in which urban sprawl had become
a major blighting factor. On June 28, 1968, the Rossos filed an appeal
from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to the Supreme Court of the
United States.2 7 It is submitted that the Puerto Rican decision should be
sustained. The technique of land banking deserves judicial and constitu-
tional sanction not only because it is a necessary and vital tool to combat
the growing blight of urban sprawl, but also because there are strong
26 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954); T.V.A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546
(1945); United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946); Adirondack Railway
v. New York State, 176 U.S. 335, 349 (1889); Little v. Loup River Public
Power District, 36 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Neb. 1949); Pearl River Valley Water
Supply District v. Brown, 156 So.2d 572, 578 (Miss. 1963), cert. den. 376
U.S. 970. See also People of Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 F.2d
316 (1st Cir. 1946) cert. den. 329 U.S. 772 (1946); M. Mercado e. Hijos v.
Superior Court, 85 P.R.R. 355 (1962); Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. Tax
Court, 81 P.R.R. 948 (1960); Commonwealth v. Heirs of Gautier, 81 P.R.R.
565 (1959); Commonwealth v. Aquayo, 80 P.R.R. 534 (1958); Commonwealth
v. Fajardo Sugar Co., 79 P.R.R. 303 (1956); Municipality v. Planning Board,
68 P.R.R. 600 (1948); McCormick v. Marrero, 64 P.R.R. 250 (1944).
27The appeal was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1258 which provides that, "Final
judgments or decrees rendered by the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: (2) By appeal,
where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties,
or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity." The
case has been filed on the appellate docket of the Supreme Court as No. 242.
See 37 L.W. 3035 (1968).
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legal arguments favoring its use. These are foreshadowed by some very
well-reasoned and forward-looking court decisions.
As the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico was careful to point out, the con-
cept of land banking is not new. In addition to those cited in the Rosso
opinion, other authorities have for years been advocating a system of land
banking such as that set out in Act 13.28 Professor John W. Reps has
argued that the following advantages, peculiar to this particular technique,
would accrue through its use:
First, this policy of public land acqui-
sition and site development would largely
overcome the evils and dangers of land
speculation which distort the growth pat-
terns of our cities and which add unneces-
sarily to the costs of housing and other
elements of urban development. It would
reduce somewhat the cost of urban land,
partly through the nonprofit nature of the
operation, partly because of lower interest
rates on capital borrowed for land pur-
chases, and partly through advance acqui-
sition of land at lower cost.
Second, the present statutory and con-
stitutional difficulties that arise in requir-
ing dedication of public sites as a condi-
tion of plat approval would be avoided.
While courts are now looking with more
favor on these impositions, many prob-
lems remain. All these would be elimi-
nated through a policy of acquiring land
to be developed and then simply with-
holding from subsequent sale or lease
those sites needed for a wide variety of
public uses.
Third, the system could provide a con-
stant flow of improved building sites to
the housing market. At the present time,
buildable land becomes available only
erratically, subject to the vagaries of per-
sonal whim, the owner's tax position, the
availability of development capital, the
often uninformed appraisal of the prob-
able market, and a host of other uncer-
tainties. Often a paradoxical shortage of
2s Commonwealth v. Rosso, supra note 2, at 56.
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building sites exists even at times of high
market demand, thus hindering the activi-
ties of builders and frustrating those who
are seeking homes. Probably the most
often repeated complaint of builders -
both large and small-is the shortage
of land.
Fourth, the proposed method of direct-
ing urban expansion would promote con-
tiguous development rather than the
wasteful, discontinuous pattern which now
prevails and which results very largely
from the whimsical characteristics of the
peripheral land market. In order to find
land on which to build, the developer
must often leap-frog over near-in tracts
which are held off the market for one rea-
son or another. The expense of public ser-
vices and facilities becomes unnecessarily
high, and the cost to individuals in time
and money is increased by this useless
and unessential dispersal. The proposed
system would normally place on the mar-
ket only land contiguous to the existing
network of services, but it could also be
employed to create new towns or detached
satellites where this is found desirable.
Fifth, as programs of urban renewal
gain momentum, the method of urban ex-
pansion which I advocate can be used to
provide land for persons displaced from
renewal operations. Public bodies have an
obligation here far greater than they now
accept. Much of the pain of renewal can
be eased and some of the opposition re-
duced by a policy of providing attractive
sites for relocation.
Finally, for the private builder the sys-
tem would provide a number of important
advantages, both economic and otherwise,
which might well counterbalance possible
financial losses through the elimination of
land speculation opportunities.
1. The small builder, increasingly at a
disadvantage in coping with the complexi-
ties of site design and land development,
December 1968]
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would be better able to compete with
large-scale tract developers. This is impor-
tant not only for him but for the consum-
er as well, in keeping prices down through
competitive sales and in providing more
opportunities for custom design and vari-
ety of accommodations.
2. Builders could concentrate on what
they know best, construction and sales.
They would avoid the worry, uncertain-
ties, and costs of engineering and land
planning services.
3. There would be no long delay as at
present in securing subdivision approval,
and the added expense of modifying site
design would be eliminated.
4. There would be no time and temper
lost in negotiating on how much land is
to be dedicated for public use or how
much in fees is to be paid in lieu of
dedication.
5. There would be substantial savings
in interest costs on money borrowed for
land purchase, since the long period dur-
ing which a site is now unproductive
would be reduced to the absolute mini-
mum.
6. The builder would know exactly the
final cost of land and site improvements,
thus reducing one of the major elements
of uncertainty in the entire process of
development.
7. He would have no performance
bonds to arrange, no contractors to deal
with in arranging for street and utility
construction, and no administrative costs
for their supervision.
8. Costs for surveying and a substan-
tial portion of his normal legal expenses
would be reflected in the price of the land
when it is conveyed to him, reducing still
further the uncertainties of estimating final
costs of production. 29
29 Reps, supra note 5, at 51-52.
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It is candidly submitted that, even without strict legal bases for sup-
port, the sociological and legislative facts and statistics noted extensively
by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico should suffice to sustain that Court's
decision. The advantages outlined by Professor Reps make land banking a
very attractive tool. The factual background of the Puerto Rican situation,
including skyrocketing land values, diminishing space and urgent need for
homes, makes the Rosso case an appealing vehicle for upholding the land
banking concept.
However, there are sound legal bases as well for sustaining Rosso. Re-
cent cases from several jurisdictions clearly indicate that the concept of
public use is expanding along the lines indicated by the Puerto Rican
Supreme Court. The new expansion allows condemnation of property for
general slum clearance and urban renewal, condemnation of underdevel-
oped vacant property for redevelopment, and finally condemnation of
small parcels of private property with no immediate use specified. In
slum clearance and public housing cases arising in the 1930's and 1940's,
a majority of state courts were already interpreting the "public use" re-
quirement in eminent domain to mean "public purpose". 30 This trans-
formed eminent domain into almost as broad a power as the government's
police or taxing powers.3 ' These cases, however, did not involve the re-
sale of publicly acquired land to private developers, a step which was
taken only in the 1950's with the advent of comprehensive urban re-
newal.32 The lower court in Rosso complained that the future indetermi-
nate uses inherent in land banking were too uncertain to qualify under
the "public purpose" rubric. However, terms such as "slum clearance" and
"urban renewal" are not particularly well-defined uses, and "redevelop-
ment" is even less precise. Taken together with this background of court
interpretation, these more recent cases, and the fact situations in which
they arose, clearly provide a sufficient framework upon which the Su-
preme Court could base a decision to affirm Rosso.
Where the focus has been on the use of condemned property for "slum
clearance and prevention," the landmark case is People ex rel. Gutknecht
v. City of Chicago,33 a quo warranto action to test the constitutionality of
the Illinois Urban Community Conservation Act. The Act created munici-
pal community conservation boards authorized to exercise, where neces-
sary, the power of eminent domain to acquire land for the purpose of
310 Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem,
58 YALE L. J. 599 at 607-608 (1949).
312 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN §7.2[2] (3d Rev. ed. 1963).
32The leading case upholding the constitutionality of urban renewal schemes is
Berman v. Parker, supra note 26.
33 3 1ll.2d 539, 121 N.E.2d 791 (1954).
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redeveloping it and preventing the spread of slum blight to new areas. 34
These purposes sound very much like some of those in the purpose clause
of Act. 13. To the contention that proceedings under the Act were not for
a public purpose, the Illinois Supreme Court responded:
. . . there exist in many urban commu-
nities areas which are 'rapidly deteriorat-
ing and declining in desirability as
residential communities and they soon
become slum and blighted areas if their
decline is not checked.' It is further found
and declared that the existence of these
areas is detrimental to the health, safety,
morals and welfare of the public, and that
the prevention of slums is a public use
essential to the public interest. [Emphasis
added]35
Following this broad definition of public use, the court indicated further:
It is also contended that the 'line of de-
marcation between a public and a private
use in the employment of eminent domain
to eliminate slum areas ... must be elimi-
nation rather than the prevention of
slums.' But we are aware of no constitu-
tional principle which paralyzes the power
of government to deal with an evil until
it has reached its maximum development.
Nor is there any force in the argument
that if the use of eminent domain in a
prevention of slums is permitted 'every
piece of property in the city or State can
be condemned to prevent it from becom-
ing a slum.' Legitimate use of governmen-
3 4 1d. at 541-543, 121 N.E.2d at 793: "The Act [ILL. REV. STAT. ch.67/2, §91.8-
91.16 (1953)] is concerned with the deteriorating urban areas called conserva-
tion areas which are likely to become slum and blighted areas if the deteriora-
tion is not arrested. It described such areas, provided for the appointment of
municipal community conservation boards and authorized the boards to designate
particular areas as conservation areas. Following the designation of a conserva-
tion area, the board is authorized after an investigation and hearings to adopt
a conservation plan for the area and required to prevent a transition into a
slum. . . .After the conservation plan for an area has been approved by the
board . . . and if the plan is adopted, the board is authorized to acquire by
purchase, condemnation or otherwise, any property, the acquisition of which
is necessary or appropriate for the implementation of the plan.
35 Id. at 543, 121 N.E.2d at 794.
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tal power is not prohibited because of
the possibility that the power may be
abused.3 6
In language reminiscent of the Rosso case, the court concluded that:
The prevention of slum and blighted areas
is a public use and a public purpose. The
legislature has found that the conditions
which it seeks to remedy exist upon an
area basis rather than upon the basis of
individual structures. It is now suggested
that this finding does not accord with the
facts. Legislative action taken to meet the
evil in the form in which it most clearly
exists cannot be said to be either clearly
unreasonable or palpably arbitrary. 3 7
The condemnation of land for the general purpose of eliminating slum and
blight conditions, which are direct products of urban sprawl, was thus
clearly upheld as a valid public purpose.
The Urban Community Conservation Act, however, stops short of Act
13. With considerable particularity the Illinois statute pointed out the
physical conditions by which a "conservation area" was to be identified3S
and the range of action which conservation plans might recommend. 3 .
And it required the preparation and adoption of a detailed plan embody-
ing the steps necessary to prevent the transition of the specific conserva-
tion area into a slum.4 0 Where the court referred to "prevention of slums"
as a public use, it was addressing itself not to the specificity of the use
but to an argument that the use was private, not public. Therefore it is
admitted that Gutknecht is not authority for a pure land banking concept
including compelled non-use or indeterminate use. However, by clear im-
plication the court readily accepted an exercise of the power of eminent
domain for a relatively unspecific public use, the elimination of a product
of urban sprawl. 4 1
In Redevelopment Agency of the City and County of San Francisco v.
Hayes,4 2 the California Appellate Court dealt with redevelopment under
36 Id. at 545, 121 N.E.2d at 795.
37 Id. at 522, 121 N.E.2d at 798.
38 Id. at 549, 121 N.E.2d at 796.
39 Id. at 549, 121 N.E.2d at 796-797.
40 Id.
41 See also Rabinoff v. District Court, 360 P.2d 114 (Colo. 1961); Zisook v. Mary-
land-Drexel Neighborhood Redevelopment Corp., 3 l1.2d 570, 121 N.E.2d 804
(1954).
42 122 Cal.App.2d 777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954), cert. den. 348 U.S. 897 (1954).
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state legislation enacted under the authority of the Housing Act of 1949.
In very general language the court upheld the application of eminent
domain proceedings to vacant but blighted land, emphasizing the emerging
view regarding public use and eminent domain:
It might be pointed out that as our com-
munity life becomes more complex, our
cities grow and become overcrowded, and
the need to use for the benefit of the pub-
lic areas which are not adapted to the
pressing needs of the public becomes
more imperative, a broader concept of
what is a public use is necessitated. Fifty
years ago no court would have interpreted
under the eminent domain statutes, slum
clearance even for public housing as a
public use, and yet, it is now so recog-
nized. . . . To hold that clearance of
blighted areas as characterized by the act
and as shown in this case and the rede-
velopment of such areas as contemplated
here are not public uses, is to view pres-
ent day conditions under the myopic eyes
of years now gone. 4 -
Nonetheless, the court was careful to point out that:
. . . neither aesthetic views nor consider-
ations of economic advantages to the
community or a combination of both are
sufficient to justify the use of eminent do-
main for redevelopment purposes. The re-
development program must be necessary
to protect the public health, morals, safe-
ty or general welfare through the elimi-
nation of blighted areas.4 4
With respect to this warning, however, some decisions have reached a
different result, upholding condemnation of largely vacant private property
which is not actually blighted. In Cannata v. City of New York, 4 5 such
an exercise of the eminent domain power was upheld in connection with a
redevelopment purpose. The statute permitted condemnation of areas which
43 Id. at 802-803, 266 P.2d at 122.
44Id. at 801-802, 266 P.2d at 121.
45 11 N.Y.2d 210, 227 N.Y.S.2d 903, 182 N.E.2d 395 (1963).
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did not exhibit "tangible" blight. The complaint centered on the argument
that without tangible blight the area in question was not a slum. Though
requiring some immediate use and some direct showing of adverse effect
upon the public health and welfare, 4 the New York Court of Appeals
upheld this redevelopment statute as it applied to non-blighted vacant land:
The section (72 of Law 1958, Ch. 924)
authorizes cities to condemn for the pur-
pose of reclamation or redevelopment
predominantly vacant areas which are
economically dead so that their existence
and condition impairs the sound growth
of the community and tends to develop
4 6 1d. at 211, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 904-905, 182 N.E.2d at 396:
. . .[T]here are in the statutes declarations by
the legislature that such reclamation and devel-
opment of such areas are necessary to protect
health, safety, and general welfare, to promote
the sound growth of the community, etc. Re-
cited by the legislature were a number of con-
ditions or "combinations thereof" which "with
or without tangible physical blight" impair or
arrest the sound growth of a community or tend
to create slums or blighted areas. There are
seven of these listed conditions as follows: Sub-
division of the land into lots of such form,
shape or size as to being capable of the type
of development; obsolete and poorly designed
street patterns with inadequate access; unsuitable
topographic or other physical conditions im-
peding the development of appropriate uses; ob-
solete utilities; building unfit for use or occu-
pancy as a result of age, obsolescence, etc.;
dangerous, unsanitary or improper uses and
conditions adversely affecting public health,
safety or welfare; scattered improvements. The
statute then goes on to declare that land assem-
bly by individual or private enterprise for pur-
poses of redevelopment in such areas is difficult
of attainment, that the conditions above listed
create tax delinquency and impair the sound
growth of the community, and that there is a
shortage of vacant land in such communities
for residential and industrial development, and
that it is necessary to clear, plan and redevelop
such vacant land, and that for such purposes it
is necessary that municipalities be given the con-




slums and blighted areas. [Emphasis
added].4 7
To the contention that the vacant land provisions were unconstitutional,
the court responded that public use was broad enough to cover such
condemnation:
Plaintiffs' argument, most simply put, is
that this taking is not for a "public use"
because it is a taking of non-slum land for
development in a so-called 'Industrial
Park' or area set aside for a new indus-
trial development. We agree with the
court below that an area does not have
to be a 'slum' one to make its redevelop-
ment a public use nor is public use ne-
gated by a plan to turn a predominantly
vacant, poorly developed and organized
area into a site for new industrial buildings.
The condemnation by the city of an
area such as this so that it may be turned
into sites for needed industries is a public
use. [Emphasis added].4s
These decisions have upheld various facets of true land banking, but no
decision has yet approved the whole concept. Gutknecht upheld an un-
specific, broad public use. Hayes upheld an even less precise use, "rede-
velopment," in the context of vacant blighted land. Cannata upheld re-
development in the context of vacant land without tangible blight or slum
conditions. The most controversial facet of land banking in its truest and
purest form is acquisition where no definite use has been determined yet.
Where courts in the United States have sustained land banking at all, it
has been the taking of a very small area and for a use which even though
not immediate is at least vaguely circumscribed. For example, in each of
the decisions just noted, a specific plan for future use of the land was
required by the urban development statutes involved.
Judicial approval of the acquisition of private land for an unspecified,
future use is the first step toward validation of the acquisition of land for
47 Id.
481d. at 212, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 906, 182 N.E.2d at 397. Other decisions which have
emphasized the development needs and specific purpose for the taking include
Fellom v. Redevelopment Agency of City and County of San Francisco, 152
Cal.App.2d 243, 320 P.2d 884 (1958); Oliver v. City of Clairton, 374 Pa. 333,
98 A.2d 47 (1953).
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an indeterminate use or complete non-use. In City of Waukegan v.
Stanczak,4 9 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the city's condemnation of
land for a school building, including some acreage beyond what appeared
to be presently needed. The court approved the "future condemnation":
As to amount, condemning authorities
have substantial discretion to take land
sufficient not only for present needs but
for future requirements . . . which they
can and should anticipate. Unless the dis-
cretion is abused or an area grossly exces-
sive is taken . . . the taking will not be
disturbed. [Emphasis added]. 5 0
The taking was small, and at least somewhat related to school needs
which could be reasonably anticipated. If the matter is one of degree only,
the Supreme Court should not balk at affirming the Rosso decision solely
because more than school needs constitute the focus for Puerto Rico. The
difference may, however, be considered one of kind: anticipated future
needs of a particular institution or program, such as a school, are more
determinate than future needs of an entire urban area.
The Florida Supreme Court, in Carlor Co. v. City of Miami,5 1 was
concerned with the future use of land intended for airport purposes where
a long delay in use had followed acquisition. Again it was not the ultimate
use of the land which was questioned, but rather the timing of the acqui-
sition and use:
It is not necessary that a political sub-
division of the state have money on
hand, plans and specifications prepared
and all other preparations necessary for
immediate construction before it can de-
termine the necessity for taking private
property for a public purpose.
During the last ten years the progress,
growth and development of the Miami
area has been beyond the expectations of
most everyone. It is the duty of public
officials to look to the future and plan for
the future. In erecting public buildings
and public improvements, it is likewise the
49 6 Ill.2d 594, 129 N.E.2d 751 (1955).
50 Id. at 604, 129 N.E.2d at 756.
5162 S.2d 897 (Fla. 1953), cert. den. 346 U.S. 821 (1953).
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duty of public officials to build and plan
not only for the present but for the fore-
seeable future. . . . The hands of public
officials should not be tied to the immedi-
ate necessities of the present but they
should be permitted, within reasonable
limitations, to contemplate and plan for
the future. [Emphasis added].52
IV. Conclusion
This is not to say that courts in the United States have taken the final
step and have already approved true land banking. Traditional legal the-
ory has required a rather strong showing of public necessity, with definite-
ness regarding time and type of development. As we have noted, the
"future use" cases have involved more limited and specified subject matters
than are involved in the breadth of Act 13 - Carlor with future airport
facilities and Stanczak with future school facilities. The broad definition of
public use is still new. Moreover, one encounters language in other recent
cases which clearly hearkens back to the narrow concepts of public use
and eminent domain:
A future hope based on speculation is not
sufficient to justify the taking of private
property in a condemnation proceeding
.. .53
In addition there are two aspects of Rosso which could detract from
its value as a general precedent. One such aspect is the equation of "public
use" with "social benefit" in the Civil Code amendment referred to ear-
lier.54 Puerto Rico has opted for the broad definition of "public use" un-
der which use by any enterprise indirectly promoting "social benefit" or pub-
lic prosperity might be said to be a public use. The narrow and more tradi-
tional definition confines "public use" to public employment or direct usage
by a public agency for a public purpose.55
That acceptance of the broader definition might be founded in part on
the Code language of "social benefit" should not be sufficient to limit the
value of Rosso as general support for the use of true land banking. First,
other decisions discussed above have indicated recognition of a newer,
52 Id. at 902-903.
5 Rueb v. Oklahoma City, 435 P.2d 139, 141 (Okla. 1967), (Involving a suit to
block condemnation of property for future airport needs.) See also Vance
County v. Roister, 155 S.E.2d 790 (N.C. 1967).
54 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
55 26 AM. JUR.2d Eminent Domain §27 (1966).
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broader view of public use. Puerto Rico has merely chosen the new view,
admittedly making its choice both through code law and the courts. Sec-
ond, any court would be free to choose between the traditional and newer
concepts even in the absence of a legislative preference. The fact that there
is such an indication of legislative intent in Rosso simply makes the de-
cision that much easier to uphold. Third, and most significantly for pur-
poses of precedent, the equation of "public use" and "social benefit" was
not a major factor in Rosso. In a sixty-one page opinion, the Court de-
voted barely four paragraphs to treatment of the amendment. 56
There is a second aspect which might be seized upon to distinguish
Rosso in other jurisdictions. The court noted at one point that the powers
conferred on the Land Commission by Act 13 verged on emergency pow-
ers and indicated that the situation in Puerto Rico verged on an emer-
gency justifying such measures.5 7 Although other courts might be able to
claim that no such "emergency" justified similar statutes in their states,
such an attitude would be both unrealistic and unfair to the whole ration-
ale of the decision in Puerto Rico. While it is useful to note the "social
use" language and the existence of emergency powers as potentially dis-
tinguishing factors, it must be emphasized that both were minor consid-
erations.
Both legal precedent and policy considerations point inescapably to the
conclusion that land banking should be approved in the Rosso case:
1. The courts, in cases like Gutknecht and Hayes, have recognized that
the results of urban sprawl - slums and blighted areas - may be attacked
by means of the eminent domain power, and that their elimination there-
fore falls within the concept of public use.
2. The courts have recognized further, as in Cannata, that the land to
be taken need not actually be blighted, but only subject to blight if not
condemned and redeveloped. There is thus a recognition that eminent do-
main may be used to strike at the source of the urban problem rather
than simply at its consequences: to strike at urban sprawl rather than
waiting for slums and blighted areas to develop.
3. The urban renewal statutes sustained in the Gutknecht, Hayes and
Cannata cases made the preparation and adoption of a detailed "redevel-
opment plan" a prerequisite to land acquisition by exercise of the eminent
domain power. It is admitted that the essence of land banking is acqui-
sition where no definite use has been determined. However, in Stanczak
and Carlor, the courts have taken a definite step toward approval of ex-
propriation of land for an indeterminate use or non-use: land need not be
taken for any purpose beyond a general intent to hold it for future par-
ticular needs.
The final step which the Supreme Court must take, therefore, is to dilute
56 Commonwealth v. Rosso, supra note 2, at 55-56.
57 Id. at 21.
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the requirement of particularity or specificity of use and broaden the range
within which a true land banking concept may operate. Legal and policy
arguments are at hand to accomplish this end.
4. Legal precedent clearly indicates that judicial interpretation of the
eminent domain power has been expansive rather than restrictive: the
range of permissible uses has been progressing toward the conclusion
reached by the Puerto Rican Supreme Court.
5. As Professor Reps has argued, there are important economic and
administrative advantages which will result through the use of land
banking.
6. In addition, a land banking system will contribute to the prevention
of slums. As the municipality acquires land through the exercise of emi-
nent domain, the resulting reduction in land prices will remove the incen-
tive which at present leads speculators to keep their land idle. Land at
reasonable prices thus will become available for development in accordance
with the general plans formulated by municipal planning authorities as the
metropolitan area expands. The availability of such land will facilitate con-
trolled development of the urban area, thereby preventing the emergence
of those economic and social ills which accompany the shortage of space
caused by unplanned urban expansion and give rise to slums.
7. The fear that condemnation of land for an indeterminate use or non-
use will lead to unrestricted governmental expropriation of private prop-
erty is unwarranted. First, as the Stanczak court recognized, the power of
eminent domain still will remain circumscribed by the requirements that
(a) the area taken must not be excessive, and (b) there must not be an
abuse of discretion on the part of the condemning authorities. Secondly,
as the Gutknecht court pointed out, the fact that all property theoretically
might be taken is not sufficient grounds to deter the exercises of eminent
domain:
Nor is there any force in the argument
that if the use of eminent domain in a
prevention of slums is permitted 'every
piece of property in the city or State can
be condemned to prevent it from becom-
ing a slum.' Legitimate use of governmen-
tal power is not prohibited because of the
possibility that the power may be
abused.58
Certainly with this clearly expanding view of public use in recent case
law, the Supreme Court of the United States should be able to affirm the
Rosso decision with much less violence to modern theory of eminent do-
5S People ex rel Gutknecht v. Chicago, supra note 33, at 545, 121 N.E.2d at 795.
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main than the trial court in Puerto Rico foresaw. Each aspect of the Rosso
case has some precedent. However, lack of a definite purpose, futurity
and broad-scale purposes have never been present in the same case before.
To this extent the Rosso decision by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
represents a departure from the present American concept of public use
in eminent domain.
It ought not remain a departure for long.

